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AGGREGATE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN SOVIET-TYPE ECONOMICS
I. Introduction
Several years ago Edward yVmes expressed doubt that "rnacroeconomic models
of the Soviet economy can be constructed along lines analogous to those of
private enterprise economies." Although Ames did not spell out his reserva-
tions in detail, they apparently arose from the questionable relevance of the
principal demand sub-model of the typical Western macro-model to an economy
in which investment outlays as well as government final purchases are centrally
determined. For, by implication, in a closed economy, consumption outlays
must therefore be fixed as a residual share of real GNP. If so, then it x-jould
appear to follow that, at the macro-level at least, money and markets do not
really matter in any fundamental sense in the Soviet economy, and, in fact,
most Western Soviet specialists have presumed that this is essentially the
case. Hence, for example, the popular description of the Soviet system as a
"command economy."
The implication that consumption can be fixed by the government as a residual
of a determinate level of GNP, however, is unrealistic in an economy with a
free labor market. In this case the supply of labor schedule, determined by
individuals balancing the opportunity cost of wage income against the utility
derived from leisure, will, given any real wage, limit the quantity of labor
supplied. Since the quantity of labor is an important determinant of total
output, the real wage and the level of total output cannot be determined inde-
pendently. The real wage, the money wage divided by the general price level,
is directly related to the quantity and quality of consumer goods and services

available. Thus, the supply of consumer goods cannot be treated as a residual
in a planned economy v/hlch does not also determine the allocation of labor.
Since planners in a Soviet-type economy are not completely free to
determine both the level and mix of output , significant insights into macro-
economic problems in a "command econoiay" may be gained using an aggregate
demand macro model similar to those models used in the analysis of market economies.
In the remainder of the paper we develop a general iriacro model similar to those
used in standard macro textbooks and use it to shed additional light on some
well known macro problems of Soviet-type economies.
II. The Model-
In our node! households hold two types of assets, goods and money.
Money consists of currency and savings deposits, the latter paying interest,
the rate set by the government. Households supply labor and earn income in
the form of wages, bonuses, and interest. Enterprises demand labor and supply
goods, attempting to maximize their bonuses within the constraints set by
the government. The government demands goods and services and determines the
allocation of investment funds. The economy may be described bj' the following
equations.
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The model contains ten equations with nine endogenous variables, N
,
N
, W, P, GNP, C, Y,, M, , and B and se\'en exogenous variables, N^ , r, I,
e Q n i-.
G, U, T
,
and GNP*. Following Walras* Law we eliininate one equation, leaving
an equal number of equations and unknov/ns
.
The labor demand schedule is assuined co be highly inelastic since the
quantity of labor demanded will be largely determined by the planners.
Considering this model as a whole, there is good reason to suppose that
it does not yet resemble the So\d.et econoiuy in at least one very important
respect, for it presupposes perfectly flexible money wages and prices through
which aggregate demand and aggregate supply may be brought into equilibrium
by price adjustments. Although official prices in the Soviet Union are not
perfectly flexible, neither are they completely rigid. There is ample evidence
to show that both wages and prices respond with a lag to disequilibrium
pressures. Thus, the model outlined above which focuses on conditions for
equilibrium in the major macro subsectors of the economy is useful for indicating
the cause and consequences of macro disequilibrium in a Soviet-type econom.;/.
The diagrams below represent the supply and demand for labor and the
aggregate supply curve where output is a function of employment.
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In diagram (a) the total wage bill and total consuraption corresponding to
every level of GNP are dra'u'n. The consaraptlon line is drawn assuming a given
rate of interest (r) and quantity of nominal cash balances (M) . The equilibrium
level of real output is GNP, and in an economy with no government sector, the
Interaction of households and firms would determine the price level and the
interest rate and thus the location of the consum.ption schedule and the division
of GNP between consumption and investment. If, however, the government inde-
pendently sets the levels of G and I, there will be only one set which will
satisfy the market clearing conditions in both the labor and commodity ir.arkets.
If the government sets I + G = GNP - C , the supply and demand for labor are
equal and the demand and supply of goods are equal.
If the government sets I and G at a level less than GNP, - C,, the demand
for goods is less than the supply and there will be downward pressure on prices.
The extent of the price decline determines tlie increase in the real wage, which
will create an excess supply of labor. The decrease In prices will increase
the real value of money balances and shift the C curve up, thereby reducing
the excess supply of goods. A disequilibrium situation would continue to
obtain, however, in the labor market. If prices did not fall, inventories
of consumer goods vrauld rise.
If the governinent sets I + G at a level greater than GNPj^ - Cj^, the
demand for goods will exceed the supply and there will be upward pressure on
prices, reducing the real wage and the quantity of labor supplied. The
increase in prices will reduce the real value of money balances and shift the
C curve down, reducing excess demand at the current level of GNP, but GNP
will be falling due to x-educed labor supplies.

In the above examples, it cannot be determined unambiguously whether or
not the model is stable because it is not sufficiently well specified for this
purpose. Consider the second case where aggregate demand exceeds aggregate
supply. Stability conditions require that aggregate demand decline as P rises.
Otherwise, with N, , N and W/P fixed by the labor market equations (1), (2),
n e
and (3), the production function, equation (4), could not be satisfied because
the demand for goods and services exceeds the supply. Since I and G are fixed
independently of the price level and of the other variables endogenous to the
model, everything depends upon the response of equation (5), the consumption
function, to price level changes. This in turn depends mainly on the influence
of M, /? (the Pigou effect) as prices rise (fall)
.
More importantly, it is common knowledge that deliberate state price policy
makes the aggregate price level quite "stickji'" in the short run in the Soviet
Union, and this fact rules out the degree of flexibility that would be required
to guarantee equilibrium in all cases. What are the consequences of sticky
prices in the case of the selection of a level of G and I which create an excess
demand for goods? In an econoiriy like that of the contemporary Soviet Union,
we would expect a persistent deficiency in the supply of consumer goods
to have, sooner or later, a significant impact upon the other supply and demand
equations. The measured average of prices, P, is the appropriate price deflator
in determining the prevailing real wage (W/P) when the supply of goods avail-
able at P appears to be perfectly elastic to the consumer. This is not the
case where there are shortages. The unavailability of goods at current prices
and the costs of queuing laises the true average price level and lowers the
real wage, resulting in a decrease in the supply of labor. This phenomenon
can alternatively be described bv the inclusion of M /P in the supply of labor
n
function. An excess demand for goods implies an excess supply of cash which

can be reduced only through a reduction in work effort if prices are sticky.
The labor supply equation may be rexvi-itten in the form:
(12) N^^ = n (W/P, N^, M-^/P),
C- TT
where it is assumed that t- ' r^ < 0. Thus, as total net financial savings
M. /P
n
iiTcreases, in excess of desired savings the supply of labor, expressed as a
function of the real wage, would shift left and output would fall.
It is reasonable to assume that there is considerable flexibility in the
supply of labor by Soviet households. First, in an economy characterized
by persistent excess demand for consumer goods, queuing offers a very worth-
while exercise of "leisure" time. The trade-off is betsv^een adding to savings
and realizing already accumulated purchasing power. Second, the female parti-
cipation rate is extremely high in the Soviet Union, but, by common report,
working women still bear aiinost exclusive responsibility for household chores,
shopping and child care. Consequently, as purchasing power accumulates in
the face of a restricted supply of goods, it would not be unreasonable to
expect a proportion of the female labor force to withdraw from the market in
part or completely. Third, growing fam.ily financial savings may permit youths
to delay entry and pensioners to forego post-retireijient employment. Fourth,
the quality of labor inputs offered m.ight very well decline as unwanted financial
savings grow, for the real wage attendant upon job ad\'ancement , for example,
would tend to carry less incentive force, especially because the Soviet worker
cannot readily be threatened with disraissal on such grounds. Finally, and
more generally, on our assumptions the labor m.arket is the only major market
in the economy in which household preferences may be expressed more or less
fully, and thus it would appear to make sense to suppose that dissatisfaction
elsewhere vjould ultimately be reflected in it. The introduction of the carry-
over variable M. /P in the labor supply ecuation does this effectivelv, and
n
jrr
. .

it implies that, other things equal, a persistent consiimption gap would
ultimately be trans forTned into an adverse effect upon the attainable level
of GNP.
The existence of black markets helps to dispel any money illusion and
to make explicit the true real wage. This is true of legal, unregulated
markets such as the collective-farrn market as well, which sell products also
carried in state and cooperative retail outlets (at lower prices). Income
earned in the public sector may of course be used to purchase goods produced
in the private sector. The increased availability of goods which are scarce
or nonexistent in the public sector is equivalent to an increase in the real
wage in the public sector. The catch, however, which has long been a problem
on the collective farm., is that workers may try to transfer labor time and state-
oi;imed materials from the public to the private sector if returns are higher
there. In any event, the growth of what has been referred to in the Soviet
Union as the "second economy" increases the share of economic activity not under
the control of the planners, a result considered highly undesirable in the
Soviet Union,
III. Kacroeconom.ic Policy
We have outlined the criteria for macroeconomic equilibrium in a Soviet-
type economy and exam.ined possible disequilibrium states characterized by in-
sufficient or excess aggregate deinand. The problem of insufficient aggregate
demand on the part of households is easily remedied and certainly does not
3
appear to be a problem in the Soviet Union. The problem of excess aggregate
demand is m.ore difficult to solve, and our m.odel implies that the failure to
im.plement counterpolicies t^TiH have serious consequences and may eventually
undermine the growth objectives of the central planners. Now, obviously, a
reduction in the share of GNP absorbed by G and I taken together v7ould serve

to reduce the consumption gap and rescorti equilibrium, Soviet planners have
been extremely reluctant to do this in the past for fear of reducing the growth
rate. It appears, however, that planners have not been willing to increase
the share of investment further, a necessary step to maintain the past rate
of growth of the capital stock. In fact, maintaining the current share of
4
investment in GNP will result in lower grov;th rates in the future. Let us
now look at the possibility of using certain macroeconomic policies to reduce
the excess aggregate demand itself or reduce the consequences of excess aggregate
demand x^ithout reducing the share of G and I In total GNP.
Price Policy
The evidence is clear that, at least during the post-Stalin period, the
overriding objective of state retail price policy has been the attainment of
5
aggregate price-level stability. Widespread queuing and the fact that prices
on uncontrolled markets commonly stand well above those in state and consumer
cooperative outJets indicate that many official prices, particularly those on
quality consumer durables, are below market clearing levels. Many quality
final products, particularly animal husbandry products, have in fact for many
years sold at levels that require state budget subsidies to producers. What
are we to make of this apparent unwillingness of the state to increase prices
to eliminate excess demand and wliat v7ould be the macroeconomic consequences
if they reversed their policy?
An increase in prices would reduce consumer demand and therefore queuing
time in state stores as well as the profitability/ of black market operations.
This action may result in the worker devoting rr-ore time to his official place
of employment. An increase to a market clearing level of P, however, only makes
explicit the true real v/age and level of real cash balances. Unless the Soviet
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consumer suffers from a money illusion, the increase in P causes no reduction
in the real wage or in the real value of TP.oney balances. Thus we should not
expect a shift of the labor supply or consumption functions. If the initial
disequilibrating levels of GNI^^S I and G are maintained, an increase in the
general price level will not restore equilibriiim due to the persistence of an
excess demand for labor at the current real wage, for the targeted level of
output is still inconsistent with the share of output devoted to consumption.
Moreover, an increase in P that created an expectation of further increases
in the future might actually make things worse in the current period by inducing
households to spend now rather than later. Taking the long-run view, then,
it may indeed by preferable policy to promote the popular expectation of a
constant general price level in order to validate and thus encourage private
voluntary saving. But whatever the case, it is not necessarily unreasonable,
where the consumption gap is substantial and expected to persist, for policy
authorities to shun price-level increases.
Interest Rate Policy
In our model the interest rate (r) paid by the state simultaneously
affects consumption and the desired level of cash balances. The rate of
interest paid on private savings deposits (and on government debt instruments
in private hands) has been surprisingly stable, and the level seems extremely?
low given the high rate of invesraent . If h . an increase in the
-J- < 0,6 r
rate of interest would reduce the level of excess demand by reducing consumption
demand. The equilibrium real wage consistent with GNP* would now also be
consistent with the desired share of G and I. A problem V70uld arise again in
the future, of course, should increased interest income not be accompanied
by increased quantities of consumer goods. In the short-run, however, Soviet
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interest rate policy appears to be irrational; which may simply reflect
traditional Soviet (and Marxist, for that cmtter) mistrust and consequent
underutilization of financial instruments.
Tax Policy
The model also suggests that excess aggregate demand could be narrowed
by increases in personal inccme taxes, but Soviet policy has been directed
instead to minimization of Income tax liabilities and to a consequent heavy
reliance upon indirect taxation. An increase in Income taxes, however, reduces
the after-tax real wage, which ixrould have the same negative effect on v/ork
incentives as an accumulation of excess cash balances or an increase in the
price level. '
Labor Market Policies
The Demand Side
The demand for plan- fulfillment bonuses (equation 10) suggests an alternative
policy approach. The award of bonuses for plan fulfillment does not motivate
managers to economize on labor inputs (or other inputs for that matter) , which
is why we have assumed that the labor demand schedule is highly inelastic.
Except insofar as the profit target (and/or the planned money-wage bill) acts
as a constraint upon managerial behavior, the individual manager need not
compare the real wage and the marginal value product of additional labor,
for any increase in real output contributes to plan fulfillment or over-fulfillment,
The main constraint in this connection is provided by Gosbank supervision of
x-Tage-bill outlaySj and even this may apparently be stretched if physical-volume
targets are being fulfilled.
During the past decade or so the Soviet managerial incentive s\'stem has
been the subject of widespread criticism and reform, and the thrust has been
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to elevate the relevance of the profit target relative to physical voluTne output
targets. Let us represent as a possible outcome a revision of equation (10):
(10)a S =^(0),
where B is a positive, but diminishing, function of enterprise profits. Such
a change ought to make the demand for labor function more elastic and thus
encourage more efficient use of labor power. It might also make managers more
receptive to labor-sa\'ing innovation. Should this lead to an increase rate
of growth of labor productivity, the effect upon the consumption gap lA'Ould, of
course, be favorable. And, indeed, it has been Soviet policy in the postXA?ar
years to share productivity gains by allowing money v/ages to rise somewhat
while keeping the GNP price index relativ^ely constant. However, it is not
clear whether the overall effect of this kind of reforra of managerial incentives
Xijould be to increase or to decrease the level of GNP managers taken as a whole
would be prepared to produce, and there is some reason to suppose that the level
of GNP would suffer in the initial stages as least, /vll in all, the kind of
managerial incentive reforms that have been discussed and, in part. Implemented
during the last decade in the Soviet Union to not seem to be sufficient to
ensure a resolution of the furtdaaiental macroeconomic problem our model suggests.
In this connection, the general reforr. movement has also recommended the
substitution of bank loans for interest-free capital grants in the hope that
this would encourage more efficient allocation and utilization of capital in-
vestment outlays." To be effective, however, the rate of interest (and
capital charges on the existing stock of capital) would have to be raised
substantially and deducted from enterprise profits prior to computation of
managerial bonuses, for interest charges on both short and long-term bank
loans are minimal at the present time. In any case, the main effect of coupling
this reform with profit maximization would be, perhaps, to reduce unnecessary
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inventory accumulation, for it could not affect fixed investment unless profit
criteria were used in making investment decisions, which is highly unlikely' to
occur in the Soviet Union. Any improveEient in efficiency due to the reforms
will result in an upward shift of the production function, allowing consumption
demands to be met without reducing the quantity of resources devoted to G and I.
The Supply Side
Finally any policy which succeeds in increasing the supply of labor or
taaking it more inelastic with respect to the real wage will reduce excess
aggregate demand at the current price level and given shares of G and 1. The
Soviets have achieved an extremely high labor participation rate at the same
time as they have reduced the restrictions on labor mobility associated witn
the Stalin era. Labor time is lost, hov?ever, through disguised uneisployinent
and job turnover. There has been a growing amount of attention paid to labor
supply problems in the Soviet Union.""
Beginning in 1967 a nationwide network of administrative agencies has
been established to increase the utilization of labor resources primarily by
reducing labor turnover. Since it is generally agreed that a major cause of
the high turnover rates is due to the gap between income aspirations and
available job opportunities, this prograBi implies an attempt to reduce freedoi?.
in the labor market.
IV. Conclusions
Given the liraited prospects offered by the supply side of the model and
the limited possibilities for utilizing price, interest rate, and tax policies
without long-run negative effects on the labor market , sooner or later per-
sistent excess demand for consumer goods must force a reduction in the share
of GNP devoted to investment and government expenditures. Otherwise, in the
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absence of direct labor controls, an acute labor shortage would develop,
resulting in a reduction in total output.
Although it would obviously be incorrect to describe this kind of
economy as "market-oriented," the model shows that the effects of a single
open market, the labor market, are pervasive. V/hat this means is that ultimately
the planners must either accomodate themselves to the rate of saving households
are prepared to accept, or they must elimjLnate the open labor market. In the
end, apart from some kind of persistent money illusion, "forced saving"
implies "forced labor."
The recent actions taken by Soviet policy makers indicate that they have
an understanding of this dilemma. On the one hand the share of consumption
12in GNP has been rising in recent years as a result of deliberate state policy.
On the other hand the Soviet discussion of labor supply problems and the
passage of restrictive labor legislation suggests the possibility of a return
to more controlled labor markets. A little freedom is a dangerous thing.
James R. Millar, Professor of Economics
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California State University at Fullerton
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